Due to the so called linguistic turn around the early twentieth century, both the methods and objects of philosophical investigations changed essentially. Many philosophers were no more concerned about the nature or essence of things but rather about the foundations and functions of our language. Thereby particularly the concepts of “meaning” “sense”, and “reference” moved into the centre of philosophical analysis. In 1892, Gottlob Frege published a paper called. “On Sense and Reference”. In 1905, Bertrand Russell introduced his famous Theory of Description in On Denoting. In the Tractatus-Logico-Philosophus, published in 1922, Ludwig Wittgenstein remarks:
The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other – he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy – but it would be the only strictly correct method.
In 1923, Charles Ogden and Ivor Armstrong published a book called The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism, and still 52 years later Hilary Putnam wrote the very influential article „The Meaning of ‚Meaning’“ just to give a few examples.
In our everyday usage, we can easily distinguish various kinds of meanings of the word “meaning”. E.g:
a) Translating words into another language, for instance in Spanish “Book” means “el libro”.
b) Defining concepts e.g.: “Bachelor” means unmarried man.
c) Communicating the content of a particular sign, e.g. a red sign with a white bar means “no thoroughfare! Or to use one of Paul Grice’s examples. “Those spots mean measles”.
d) Expressing appreciation e.g.: Being here means very much to me.
Etc.
In PI 43 Wittgenstein remarks:
“For a large class of cases — though not for all — in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: The meaning of a word is its use in the language."
Keeping this conception in mind, I will only concentrate on the meaning of a particular kind of verbal expressions i.e. our psychological vocabulary. Here, it will be important to look very closely at the relation between mental concepts and their corresponding sensations. I will try to do this by introducing a few ideas of Wittgenstein’s understanding and treatment of such expressions the way I understand them.
Generally speaking, Wittgenstein argued throughout his all oeuvre that philosophical problems essentially arise from a misunderstanding of the logic of our language. Once asked in a discussion what Wittgenstein regarded as the major problem in philosophy his answer was “Subject and predicate”. And in PI 109 he remarks: “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.”
Within the context I am going to discuss now, probably most of us immediately think of PI 243-315 and the famous so called Private Language Argument, a term, however, never mentioned by Wittgenstein himself, although in one of his notebooks he does speak about the “discussion of a private language” (MS 165, 101).
For the discussion of the Private Language Argument at least three notions seem to be crucial:
1). Private ownership with respect to our sensations. I.e. what does it mean to say that e.g. “I have a particular pain”? Is there a logical difference between sentences using the verb ‘to have’ in connection with mental expressions such as “I have pains”, “I have a bad feeling”, “I have no idea”, etc. and sentences such as “I have 5 Euro in my pocket”, „I have short brown hair” etc.? Can another person have my pains”? Can two persons have the same pain?
And connected therewith: What is the relation between sensations and their expressions? Can, e.g., my having a particular present sensation, justify me in using mental vocabulary in referring to it?
2.) Epistemic privacy. i.e. “Can only I know whether I am in pain whereas other persons can only surmise it? Or in other words: “Can only I be certain about whether I have a particular sensation whereas others could always be mistaken?
3.) If my sensations are private, can I than give meaning to my mental vocabulary by pointing, so to speak, inwardly towards a particular sensation, I am referring to as the meaning of the particular concept? Or generally speaking: Can a Private Ostensive Definition fix the meaning of a particular mental expression?
The very complexity and depth of all the various problems and facets involved in that discussion allow me to only point at a very small range of aspects. Besides looking at a few remarks in the paragraphs 243-315 of PI, I will try to do this by additionally including a dictation from Wittgenstein to Moritz Schlick, where Wittgenstein also discusses the concept of pain in connexion with the concepts “to know and “to have”. Here, I will particularly focus on the question whether two persons can have the identical pain and what it could mean to express such a proposition in the first place.
But let me first allow a few remarks on the transitions from Wittgenstein’s early to his later philosophy.
...
0 comentarios:
Publicar un comentario en la entrada